unconscious" -generally understood to be an active component of one's mental life that escapes one's direct awareness, but which may nevertheless influence one's behavior.
It is well known, especially in the German-speaking world but also to a lesser degree in the Anglophone territories, that Freud was not the first person to offer a detailed theoretical account of what is called "the unconscious." Yet there has until now been no detailed study in English of the various ways in which the unconscious was conceptualized or "thought" by German-speaking intellectuals during the nineteenth century. The central purpose of this volume is to fill this gap by providing an in-depth account of key figures in this conceptual history, not only in terms of how they may or may not have influenced Freud and the origins of psychoanalysis generally, but also in terms of their independent historical and contemporary relevance for other fields such as philosophy, literature, and aesthetics. In accordance with this analytical framework, this volume has also been edited with a strong commitment to the philology of the German language, in an attempt to avoid the frequent mistranslations and misinterpretations that occur when analyzing cultural traditions in foreign languages (Anglophone mistranslations of Freud being perhaps the best-known case in point).
3 For this reason, all quotations from the German primary sources appear in the original German in the notes, and where a term has a particular resonance in German that cannot be captured in English translation, the original German term appears in brackets in the main text.
Nietzsche's remarks, although directed first and foremost at Hartmann, also touch upon a series of irreducible philosophical questions with which this volume is confronted. If, by its very definition, "the unconscious" escapes our conscious awareness, then how is it possible to "think" about it at all? If we do in some way manage to "think" the unconscious, does it not thereby cease to be unconscious, thus defeating the purpose of the entire enterprise? Would it not be better to withdraw completely from any rational or "conscious" analysis of the unconscious, leaving the way free for other modes of expression -the visual arts, poetry, or musicto bring unconscious affects to light? If it is difficult or impossible to "think" the unconscious, how can it even be an object of knowledge expressed in the substantive form "the unconscious"? And can one in fact assume the ontological existence of "the unconscious," or is this "object" or "realm" merely an invention of Western (in this case particularly but not exclusively German) thought? In short: does the unconscious exist 4 In answer to these questions, the chief English-language precursor to this study -Henri F. Ellenberger's magisterial The Discovery of the Unconscious: The History and Evolution of Dynamic Psychiatry (1970) -proceeds on the assumption that "the unconscious" is, more or less like the brain, an aspect of human subjectivity which has an objective existence in all members of the human race, regardless of ethnicity, geography, and cultural or religious difference. Yet in light of the fact that the human sciences and the humanities in general necessarily play a role in creating their own object -the "human," understood not only as an empirical or biological organism but also as a thinking subject capable of self-reflection, self-definition, and therefore also of self-transformationthis study remains open to the possibility that theorists of the unconscious actually invent or think the non-empirical "object" or phenomena which they attempt to describe. 5 In this sense, the notion that the unconscious was "discovered" necessarily forecloses upon the question as to whether "the unconscious" or "unconscious phenomena" actually exist objectively and independently of their theoretical elaborations. Thus, despite its invaluable contribution to the history of Western psychiatry and psychoanalysis, Ellenberger's study must be regarded as being methodologically inadequate. In light of this fact, the title of this volumeThinking the Unconscious -attempts both to express and to preserve the fundamental ontological instability of its theme.
Two further important questions raised by the title of this study -why "German" and why the nineteenth century? -necessitate an account here of how and why the question of the unconscious became a central theme of German thought from 1800 onwards, and this account must commence, not at the beginning of the nineteenth, but at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Arnim Regenbogen has correctly pointed out that the history of the unconscious can be understood both as the history of a philosophical problem (Problemgeschichte) and as the history of a concept (Begriffsgeschichte). 6 Where and when this problem and this Nonetheless, if our central concern here is the discourses on the unconscious which took place in nineteenth-century German thought, then the origin of the problem which these discourses seek to address is relatively easy to identify.
Petites perceptions and the unconscious: Descartes, Leibniz, Wolff, and Platner
The problem turns out to have originated in seventeenth-century France. When René Descartes (1596-1650) posits, in his Meditations on First Philosophy (1641), the central dualism of modern European thoughtaccording to which being is divided into the categories of thinking and extended substance (res cogitans and res extensa) -he associates res cogitans or thinking substance exclusively with consciousness. The famous proposition cogito ergo sum ("I think therefore I am") thus relates the core of human being -in other words, the soul -exclusively to thought and therefore to consciousness. Since conscious thought alone guarantees the existence of the human subject, then it is literally impossible, in Cartesian terms, to conceive of unconscious mental states, since to be without consciousness would mean to lack any being whatsoever, as Descartes observes: "it could be that were I totally to cease from thinking, I should totally cease to exist." 10 Descartes' definition of the human subject as res cogitans offers both a functional and a material definition of consciousness. In functional terms, Descartes outlines a structure, substance or ground within human subjectivity (that is, the soul) in which mental contents are cognized; while in material terms consciousness refers to those mental contents themselves which are apprehended: in everyday parlance the "facts," "stream" or "field" of consciousness.
11 In the British empiricism of John Locke and David Hume, the latter (material) sense of consciousness is maintained, while the former is regarded as being unsubstantiated. Consciousness, for Locke, is merely the "perception of what passes in a man's own mind," while for Hume it is the "inward sentiment" that arises from one's perceptions and ideas.
12 Since, however, the self or "I" to which these perceptions belong cannot be proven to exist on an empirical basis, the question as to the substantial ground of consciousness is regarded as being unanswerable, the self being, according to Hume's well-known formulation, nothing more than a "bundle" of different perceptions. In Germany, by contrast, Descartes' functional or substantial conception of consciousness received a more positive reception in the Monadology (1714) of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. At the same time, however, Leibniz attempted to replace Cartesian dualism with a monism that would unify thinking and extended substance. For Leibniz, the entire universe is constituted of simple, immaterial, and indivisible unities known as monads, all of which are capable, albeit to vastly differing degrees, of having perceptions.
14 Every monad is unique and develops according to its own internal law, being endowed with what Leibniz variously calls appetite or striving. Each monad strives to achieve what it regards, from within the limitations of its own position in the universe, to be the apparent good. In being immaterial and directed towards the good, monads are seen by Leibniz as mirroring the qualities of God, 16 and in this respect they are at least theoretically capable of representing the whole universe, albeit only from their own particular points of view. The development of monads occurs in complete isolation: described by Leibniz as being "windowless," they are neither susceptible of alteration by external sources, nor do they have direct relationships with other monads. 17 Thus, although separate monads may seem to interact with one another causally, Leibniz's doctrine concerning the harmonie préétablie (pre-established harmony) between all forces or substances ensures that each monad develops independently and yet in perfect harmony with other monads.
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In Leibniz the ontological status of the human self, subject, or soul is thus secured by virtue of its status as a monad. Since the monad is constantly active and functions at all times as a mirror of the entire universe, it is (even during sleep) continually subject to perceptions about this universe; yet these perceptions are characterized by wide differences in terms of their clarity and distinctness, ranging from those of which the subject is completely unaware on the one hand, to those which are clear and distinct on the other, with endless gradations of clarity and distinctness existing between these two extremes.
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On the lower end of the scale of consciousness, there exist what Leibniz calls, in his New Essays on Human Understanding (Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain) both petites perceptions (small perceptions) and perceptions insensibles (unnoticed perceptions). 20 As its title suggests, this text (completed in 1705 but not published until 1765) constitutes Leibniz's most comprehensive response to John Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690). Locke had expressed doubts concerning the Cartesian idea that the essence of the soul lies in its thinking activity, arguing that certain non-conscious states -like, for example, the state of sleep -demonstrate that the soul may experience interruptions in its thinking, and that it is therefore not purely to be identified with the activity of thought. In this way, Locke rules out the possibility that "any thing should think, and not be conscious of it." 21 In response to Locke's argument, Leibniz proposes "there is in us an infinity of perceptions … of which we are unaware because these impressions are either too minute and too numerous, or else too unvarying, so that they are not sufficiently distinctive on their own." Thus, for example, what we experience as "the roaring noise of the sea" is actually the cumulative sensation of many individual waves crashing on the shore. Although each of these individual waves does not on its own create a sufficient impression to enter our consciousness, when combined they may in fact enter our conscious awareness. In this situation we are made conscious of the cumulative effect of the waves, but not of their discrete, individual existences. Similarly, when one has become habituated to living by a waterfall, the noise which it creates may escape our conscious awareness, fading into the background of our everyday existence. 22 In both the New Essays and the Monadology, Leibniz distinguishes between these petites perceptions (often termed simply perceptions), and what he calls apperceptions. Perceptions occur at a low level of consciousness and do not entail reflexive consciousness or thought, and for this reason Leibniz holds that even "beasts" may have perceptions. Apperceptions, by contrast, are perceptions of which the subject has a conscious or reflexive awareness, and which may be said to amount to conscious thoughts. 23 Leibniz's theory of petites perceptions or perceptions without consciousness is normally seen as having inaugurated the German philosophical discourse on the unconscious. 24 Yet here a particular caution with regard to the use of terminology is in order. It is clear from Leibniz's argumentation that his notion of petites perceptions does not demarcate a type of perception that is radically different from what he calls apperceptions or perceptions of which one is reflexively aware; in fact, it may be argued that the difference consists only in the intensity, clarity and distinctness of these perceptions rather than in their fundamental type. As we shall see, this has led some to suggest that in the case of Leibniz, the term unbewusst (unconscious) might well be replaced by that of unterbewusst (beneath consciousness), designating a field of perception which merely exists beneath a particular threshold of conscious awareness, but which could easily become conscious upon the focusing of one's attention. This is certainly the sense in which Leibniz's idea of petites perceptions was interpreted by two of his most important successors in the German tradition of psychology -Christian Wolff (1679-1764) and Ernst Platner (1744-1818) -both of whom are also seen as being key figures in the history of the unconscious. In his Rational Thoughts on God, the Soul of Man, and Also All Things in General (Vernünfftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt, 1720), Wolff defines consciousness as the self-reflexive knowledge that we represent things to ourselves as being external to us, and as the ability to differentiate individual things from one another ( § §728, 729). Wolff argues, for example, that when he holds a mirror in front of his face, he is conscious of the fact that he is holding the mirror, that he sees his own image in the mirror, and that the mirror is an object which is differentiated from himself as well as from other objects in his immediate surroundings ( §729). Were he not capable of such differentiation, then he would not be conscious of these objects, since "when we do not notice the difference between the things that attend us; then we are not conscious of the things that fall into our senses." 25 Similarly, when one is reading a book, although one may hear a conversation going on the background, if one does not pay attention to the conversation then one is not conscious of it ( §729). Consciousness is thus defined by Wolff in Cartesian terms: in relation to clarity and distinctness. If we fail to differentiate between the things that occur to our senses, this leads to what Wolff terms ( §731) "darkness of thoughts" (Dunckelheit der Gedancken).
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Wolff's consideration of obscure or dark thoughts did not go unnoticed by his philosophical successors, and led, albeit indirectly, to the raising of aesthetic questions which would later re-emerge in German idealism and romanticism. In 1759, the Swiss mathematician Johann Georg Sulzer (1720-79) opined that philosophers should pay the closest attention to the dark areas of the soul (die genauste Aufmerksamkeit auf die dunkeln Gegenden der Seele … richten) . 27 Yet as Hans Adler has pointed out, Sulzer's project was arguably couched in Enlightenment terms: that of exploring, conquering, and in a sense domesticating the dark areas of the soul by exposing them to rational analysis. 28 It was the German philosopher Alexander Baumgarten (1714-62) who thought that these dark areas of the soul called for a different method of consideration than that normally deployed by traditional metaphysics. Already in the first edition of his Metaphysica (1739), Baumgarten sees obscure or dark perceptions (perceptiones obscurae) as being the foundation of the soul (fundus animae), and in the fourth (1759) edition of the Metaphysica this Latin construction is replaced with the German Grund der Seele. In §1 of Baumgarten's Aesthetica (part 1: 1750; part 2: 1758) those perceptions which are obscure, dark, or inferior (gnoseologia inferior) are associated with the particular, sensitive, and sensuous modes of cognition (cognitionis sensitiuae) found in poetry, as opposed to the general, clear, and distinct modes of conceptual cognition found in philosophy; while the analysis of inferior, obscure, or sensuous cognition belongs to aesthetics -otherwise known as the theory of the liberal arts (theoria liberalium artium) -clear and distinct cognitions belong to metaphysics.
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A less innovative reception of Wolff can be found in the work of Ernst Platner, whose Philosophical Aphorisms (Philosophische Aphorismen, 1776) is widely regarded as the first German text to use the word Unbewußtseyn (unconsciousness). 30 Platner inherits the essentially Leibnizian epistemological framework of Wolff. The soul (Seele) is regarded as a substance (Substanz) and a power (Kraft) which brings forth impressions or ideas (Wirkungen, Ideen). Since power or Kraft is defined solely in terms of activity (Thätigkeit), the soul must always be active; otherwise it would cease to exist. This leads Platner to argue that the soul continues to have ideas during sleep, and that "the soul is not always conscious of its ideas" (Die Seele ist sich nicht ihrer Ideen immer bewußt). Following Leibniz and Wolff, Platner refers to those ideas with consciousness (mit Bewußtseyn) as apperceptions, and to those without consciousness (ohne Bewußtseyn) as dark or obscure representations (dunkle Vorstellungen). In this way, the life of the soul is seen by Platner as being an unbroken series of ideas or impressions, which wax and wane between apperceptions and perceptions, waking and sleeping (Wachen und Schlaf), consciousness and unconsciousness (Bewußtseyn und Unbewußtseyn).
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Kant's anthropology and the "dark map of the mind"
With the possible exception of Leibniz, Immanuel Kant arguably determined the way in which unconscious phenomena were understood in nineteenth-century German thought more than any other philosopher of the eighteenth century. Although Kant's of Leibniz and particularly to the latter's notion of pre-established harmony is well known, 32 there is nonetheless, in the early (pre-critical) Kant, a positive reception of Leibniz's ideas of petites perceptions. The earliest example of this is to be found in Kant's Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy (Versuch, den Begriff der negativen Grössen in die Weltweisheit einzuführen, 1763), part 3 of which attempts to apply the mathematical concept of negative magnitude to psychology, and especially to the coming to be and passing away of thoughts. How is it, Kant asks, that at one moment he can be thinking of the sun, and the next minute this thought disappears, only to be replaced by new thoughts? His answer is that, just as in physics a force is cancelled by an opposing force of equal or greater intensity, so too in our minds are thoughts negated or cancelled by mental contents which oppose them. This argument is then advanced in terms of clarity and distinctness: "the clearer and the more distinct a certain idea is made," according to Kant, "the more the remaining ideas are obscured [verdunkelt] and the more their clarity is diminished." 33 Those thoughts which are, in Kant's words, verdunkelt (darkened or obscured) would thus appear to bear some similarity to Leibniz's petites perceptions, as well as to the "dark thoughts" (dunkle Gedancken, dunkle Vorstellungen) of Wolff and Platner respectively. For this reason it is no coincidence that Kant invokes Leibniz in this context, opining that There is something imposing and, it seems to me, profoundly true in this thought of Leibniz: the soul embraces the universe only with its faculty of representation, though only an infinitesimally tiny part of these representations is clear. 34 
